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Abstract 
 
The East Asian crisis of 1997 sparked an extensive literature in an effort to explain the 
causes and spread of heightened foreign exchange (FX) market pressures in the region. In 
this paper we model FX movements and calculate spillover effects covering the extended 
period between 1990 and 2004. Using Markov switching vector autoregressions, we find 
evidence that FX correlations vary across crisis and non-crisis states, a result that bears 
implications for international portfolio diversification and reserve pooling. Even though 
the direction of effects does not follow discernible patterns, it is clear from the data that 
contagion effects are present.  
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 Introduction 
 A 1999 IMF factsheet on the Fund’s response to the Asian crisis of 1997 states 
that “[...] the IMF, along with everyone else, did not foresee the scale of the financial 
contagion that followed the events in Thailand”.2 A key event was the devaluation of the 
Thai baht in July 1997. Even though Thailand was running a current account deficit of 
almost 8% of GDP and, hence, was susceptible to an exchange rate correction, other 
countries in the region, that were subsequently affected by speculative attacks in the 
foreign exchange market were not experiencing equivalently large external imbalances at 
the time. The region’s impressive GDP growth rates in the early 1990s had earned the 
countries the title ‘Asian tigers’. With a reputation for fiscal prudence and reasonably low 
inflation rates it seemed that little threatened their continued economic advance. 
 With the liberalization of capital accounts new foreign money was channelled into 
the south-east Asian economies mainly through the banking system. However, a 
combination of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems led to excessive 
borrowing (e.g. Mishkin, 1999, Corsetti et al., 1998). An underestimation of the risks 
both by bank managers and international investors meant that several firms were 
burdened with substantial amounts of foreign currency short-term debt. This constituted a 
serious problem, as most firms’ earnings were in local currency, an imbalance that 
seriously exposed them to the risk of devaluation.    
 So, the source of the Asian crisis was not related to the macroeconomic 
fundamentals but rather to the inability of the private sector to allocate funds to the most 
productive uses through an appropriate assessment of risks. In other words, the region’s 
                                                 
2 Available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm. 
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problem was structural in the sense that financial market regulation, supervision and 
management were inadequate. The real effects of the crisis were painful, as growth rates 
in the region were adversely affected. Related speculative pressures in the FX markets 
eventually led several governments to abolish their currency pegs (at least temporarily) 
and, as a result, the region’s currencies depreciated sharply –a possible reason for the 
resumption of positive growth rates relatively soon after the crisis. 
 Since these events took place, a substantial amount of research has examined the 
mechanisms through which the crisis was dispersed amongst countries in the region. This 
paper covers similar ground, but uses recently devised econometric tools. It also exploits 
a more complete set of data running up until 2004. This allows comparisons to be made 
between crisis and non-crisis periods. More specifically, the paper addresses a number of 
research questions. 
            First, is the relationship between currencies as measured by exchange rates 
different from that between wider FX market pressure indicators? If so, this suggests that 
different countries may respond to spillover effects in different ways with some allowing 
the exchange rate to take the strain of adjustment and others opting for rising interest 
rates and/or reserve decumulation. Second, does the relationship (the extent and nature of 
the spillovers) differ between crisis and non-crisis periods? This is an important question 
for the risk management of internationally diversified portfolios. If the relationship 
changes, then what might be sensible behaviour before a crisis may not be as sensible 
during (or after) it. Third, are contagion effects present is south-east Asian FX markets 
and, if yes, which countries are the sources and which the recipients?              
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The paper is empirical. We do not seek to impose and test any particular model. 
However, the relationships we examine are informed by the relevant theory. Thus, before 
moving on to examine the empirical evidence we attempt to place our empirical research 
in the context of existing analysis of economic and financial crises and contagion. 
 
Crisis, Interdependence and Contagion 
The economic crises of the 1990s and early 2000s have generated interest in a 
range of issues. The first issue is that of why crises occur. The ‘first generation’ model 
(see e.g. Krugman, 1979) accentuates fiscal and monetary mismanagement leading to 
currency overvaluation and reserve depletion. The ‘second generation’ model (see e.g. 
Obstfeld, 1994) emphasises inconsistencies between domestic and external targets at a 
favoured exchange rate, which induces speculators to anticipate devaluation. The ‘third 
generation’ model (see e.g. Corsetti et al. 1999) focuses on deficiencies in the domestic 
and foreign financial sectors that then result in a ‘feast and famine’ pattern of capital 
flows. 
 The second issue relates to the nature of crisis spillovers between countries. These 
may reflect economic interdependencies via, for example, foreign trade, but they may 
also reflect contagion when market psychology changes. Part of the recent literature seeks 
to disentangle the extent to which country correlations capture interdependencies as 
opposed to contagion, and to examine the extent to which crises lead to closer 
correlations than would be expected on the basis of economic interdependencies.3
                                                 
3 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) highlight the role of heteroscedasticity in testing for contagion, where the 
latter is defined as a significant change in the real transmission mechanism in crisis states. Empirical studies 
of contagion adopting various definitions include, among others, Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick and Rose 
(1999), Caramazza et al. (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).  
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  Both of the above issues have received a great deal of attention in the literature. A 
related topic of interest, which we address in this paper, is that of the nature of cross-
country correlations involving measures of pressure in the FX market. Imagine that there 
is a financial crisis in one country which leads to a deterioration in overall market 
psychology and to increasing market pessimism. Capital markets may then seek to 
withdraw funds from other countries whose foreign exchange markets will as a result be 
put under pressure (this is the ‘common lender effect’, where investors holding 
international portfolios and seeking liquidity will sell assets in a market following an 
asset price fall in another). The crisis in the first country triggers a FX crisis elsewhere. 
Of course, some countries may be more vulnerable to crisis than others; the second 
generation model emphasises the interplay between time-inconsistent policy objectives 
and vulnerability. But there may also be differences in response. Some affected countries 
may be more inclined to allow the value of their currencies to fall, others may opt for 
more rapid decumulation of reserves and still others may be more inclined to raise 
interest rates. Finally, some countries may attempt to insulate themselves from the crisis 
by imposing capital controls. The choice will ultimately be affected by views about the 
effectiveness of alternative responses and the political economy of the distribution of 
gains and losses associated with them. Given that such views may vary across countries it 
seems probable that FX pressure will be exhibited in different forms in different 
countries. 
 Our paper in part explores this issue. There are two ways in which we could 
approach it. An ambitious approach would be to establish theoretical priors on the basis 
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of a formal analysis of the views and preferences discussed above. A second, less 
ambitious but much more manageable approach, and the one we adopt here, is to examine 
the nature and structure of FX market correlations. By examining the revealed 
preferences of countries’ authorities we can perhaps infer something about their 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the various instruments as well as the political 
economy of gains and losses. 
 A further issue in the context of crises relates to their spatial distribution. At one 
level there is the question of whether crises are regionally contained. But beyond this 
there are the questions of whether, at a more disaggregated level, regional ‘neighbours’ 
are differently affected and why they may be differently affected. The concept of 
‘regionalisation’ suggests that there will be little regional differentiation, since regional 
proximity is sometimes assumed to be the driving force behind contagion. However, this 
may be unduly simplistic. Instead, it is perhaps more realistic to posit that, even within 
regions, there will be variations in crisis vulnerability. For this reason capital markets 
may not regard all ‘regional’ assets as equally close substitutes for one another. 
 The above discussion leads to a more subtle issue. Where spillovers incorporate 
both interdependence and contagion, it may in principle be that the pattern of correlations 
changes depending on whether or not there is a crisis. Thus, for example, two countries 
where there are relatively limited economic interdependencies may reveal relatively low 
FX spillovers in non-crisis conditions. In crisis conditions, however, other factors may 
come into play, such that the vulnerability to crisis and the degree of substitutability 
between financial assets. This may then mean that crisis correlations are significantly and 
relatively higher in a crisis. If this were to be the case, it would have implications for 
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creditors’ portfolio management. Portfolio managers can clearly seek to reduce portfolio 
risk by means of diversification. But diversification will not help if there is a close 
positive correlation between the different assets in the portfolio. If, however, the pattern 
of correlation changes as between crisis and non-crisis periods, the composition of the 
risk-minimising portfolio will also change. A portfolio that minimises risk in non-crisis 
conditions may fail to insulate returns in a crisis where minimising risks may be even 
more important. 
 In summary, while this paper is essentially empirical, it is motivated by the 
existing theory and literature on crisis and contagion. In what follows, we seek to 
determine the extent and nature of spillovers during crisis and non-crisis periods in the 
occasionally turbulent FX markets of south-east Asia.  
 
Data and Variables 
 Monthly nominal bilateral exchange rates with the US dollar for Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are taken from International Financial Statistics 
published by the IMF. Figure 1 captures the recent history of exchange rate movements in 
the south-east Asian FX markets. The five countries in our sample had implemented a 
variety of exchange rate regimes over the sample period, but immediately before July 
1997 they were all de facto fixing their currencies to the US dollar. When speculative 
pressures in the region arose, interest rates escalated and international reserves fell in an 
effort to defend the values of the local currencies. Eventually, the countries abolished 
their quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes and floated their currencies.4  
                                                 
4 According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) prior to the 1997 events all countries in the sample were 
running de facto pegs against the US dollar (except Malaysia, which was operating a de facto moving band 
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 We use nominal exchange rates, interest rates and international reserves in the 
construction of a foreign exchange (FX) market pressure indicator (fxmpi). Our analysis 
is based on two ‘crisis’ measures: the percent change in the values of the nominal 
exchange rate (dlxr) and fxmpi.5 Increases in the value of fxmpi signify more pressure 
(hence the negative sign for the reserves component of the indicator): 
[ ] 100**** tttt dlresdirdlxrfxmpi γβα −+= , 
where dir is the change in the domestic interest rate and dlres is the change in the natural 
logarithm of international reserves minus gold (in dollars). The weights of the variables 
are determined as follows: 
dlresdirdlxr
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111
1
++
=α , 
dlresdirdlxr
dir
SDSDSD
SD
111
1
++
=β , and 
dlresdirdlxr
dlres
SDSDSD
SD
111
1
++
=γ , 
where SD stands for standard deviation. The need to use both measures arises from the 
fact that it is possible that nominal exchange rate movements do not reveal the extent of 
speculative pressures. These may be reflected by the use of other policy instruments (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                                 
around the US dollar). Post-crisis all currencies were freely floating (or falling). Eventually some reverted 
to managed floats (Philippines, Thailand) or established new pegs (Malaysia). 
5The variable fxmpi has its roots in Girton and Roper (1977). The use of similar indices to capture pressures 
in the FX market is not unusual (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1996), even though there have also been criticisms 
(see Eika et al., 1996 and Willett and Nitithanprapas, 2000). 
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reserves, interest rates and capital controls). Hence, we can use fxmpi to assess the 
presence of speculative pressures and dlxr to determine how successful these have been.6  
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the two crisis measures. 
Even though percent changes in exchange rates are highly correlated between countries in 
the sample, the same cannot be said about the wider pressure indicator.  Figures 2a and 
2b plot the series over time. The increased volatility in mid 1997 is evident in both. But 
whereas the volatility of fxmpi subdued post-1997 (with the exception of Indonesia), the 
volatility of dlxr increased (with the exception of Malaysia that quickly resorted to a 
fixed exchange rate regime). This is natural, since following the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates after the crisis pressures in the FX market were reflected in changes in the 
exchange rate, hence reducing the need for use of interest rates and/or reserves as policy 
instruments.   
 
Tranquil and Crisis Regimes 
 To model the time series we adopt a commonly used strategy for the analysis of 
structural change: a Markov regime switching model (see e.g. Hamilton, 1989). This 
approach is appropriate, as the model assumes autoregressive processes in which the 
parameters depend on the realizations of an unobserved regime variable, which in turn is 
modelled as a Markov chain. The latter assumes that realizations of the state only depend 
on their (chronologically) previous realization. The regime variable is discrete and can 
only take two values: 0 if there is no crisis and the distribution has a low mean and 1 if 
there is a ‘crisis’ and the distribution has a high mean. In contrast to Hamilton (1989) we 
assume a heteroscedastic setting in which the variance changes across the two regimes. 
                                                 
6 We do not incorporate a measure of capital controls in our estimations because of the unreliability of data. 
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 The model can be written as 
( ) ttttt yysy εββµ ρρ +++=− −− ...11 , 
where ρ  denotes the order of the autoregression and µ  is the regime-dependent mean 
conditional on the state variable, . The ts β s are autoregressive coefficients to be 
estimated and ε  is a normally distributed error term with zero mean and regime-
dependent variance. In this setting, we can estimate the matrix of transition probabilities, 
which contains the probabilities of remaining in one regime and of switching to another. 
In the case with two regimes we have four such probabilities: , ,  and , 
where, for example,  gives the probability of remaining in regime 1 and  gives the 
probability of switching from regime 1 to regime 2.
11p 12p 21p 22p
11p 12p
7  
Table 2a gives the results of the estimations of a heteroscedastic Markov 
switching (intercept) model with two regimes and three autoregressive terms for fxmpi, 
which is denoted as MSIH(2)-AR(3) using Krolzig’s (1997) notation.8 It can be seen that 
for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines regime 2 is identified as one with 
higher FX pressures (as captured by the higher mean). In contrast, for Thailand regime 2 
is the low pressure regime. In all cases, regime 2 is more volatile (as captured by the 
higher standard errors). Both regimes are quite persistent, although regime 2 less so than 
1, indicating that the probability of switching from a non-crisis to a crisis regime is lower 
than the probability of switching from a crisis regime to a non-crisis regime. Results for 
dlxr (Table 2b) are quite similar, although regimes are now less persistent. In addition, 
                                                 
7 The model of Hamilton assumes that the transition probabilities are constant. This has the implication that 
exogenous variables cannot affect the probability of switching from one regime to another. Diebold (1994) 
and Filardo (1994) extend the model to time-varying transition probabilities.  
8 Setting a different lag length than the reported of three months does not affect the results substantially. 
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and consistent with the rest of the sample, regime 2 for Thailand is now a crisis regime. 
Malaysia’s distributions of observations across the two regimes are the same.  
Visual inspection of the crisis regime probabilities using both measures (not 
reported) shows that for most countries the period from mid 1997 to early 1998 was 
characterized by speculative pressures and falls into the category of a crisis regime. The 
apparent ‘synchronicity’ of the incidence of crises may reflect regional inter-dependence 
arising from trade links, a common unobserved shock, or contagion. 
 In this paper, we do not try to determine the exact classification of the spillovers 
although we do test several related hypotheses. First, we examine the contemporaneous 
correlations between the pressure indicators across regimes. This has important 
implications for portfolio management. The possibility that the correlations may change 
sign and/or magnitude in different states of the world could affect the risk characteristics 
of a portfolio with holdings in the different markets. In order to carry out this exercise we 
need to extend the methodology to a Markov switching vector autoregression (see Kolzig, 
1997). Examining the FX market in the context of a system of interrelated economies has 
the advantage that we are allowing the market in question to be affected by recent 
movements in other markets as well as by recent movements in the market itself. Hence, 
we can calculate and compare the (regime-dependent) correlations.  
 Second, we construct the multivariate version of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
contagion test, as proposed by Dungey et al. (2005). This allows us to examine the effects 
of each country’s FX market on the rest of the countries in the sample, while controlling 
for the effect of heteroscedasticity. Even though there is no agreed definition of contagion 
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in the literature (see pp. 96-98 in Chui and Gai, 2006 for a taxonomy of definitions) we 
will interpret as contagion an increase in conditional correlations in the crisis regime. 9
  
Regime-dependent Correlations 
 Turning to the VAR version of the fixed transition probability model, the system 
can now be written as 
( ) tjt
j
jtt yBsy εµ
ρ
+=− −
=
∑
1
, 
where y is a vector of dependent variables and B denotes a matrix of estimated 
parameters. Matrices B are square matrices with the number of columns and rows equal 
to the number of series in the autoregression. There are as many Bs as the order of the 
autoregression. 
Estimation of this model assuming two regimes and an autoregressive order ρ =1 
(consistent with the Schwarz criterion) gives the results reported in table 3. It is evident 
that, for both measures, regime 1 is classified as a tranquil regime with a low mean and 
variance, whereas regime 2 is classified as a crisis regime with a high mean (indicating 
devaluations/pressures in FX) and increased volatility. The tranquil regime continues to 
be highly persistent implying that switching to a crisis regime is associated with a 
relatively low probability. Switching back from a crisis regime to a tranquil one is, on the 
other hand, associated with a higher probability, even though crisis regimes are also fairly 
persistent.  
                                                 
9 Our approach does not include fundamentals given the monthly frequency of our data and the absence of 
agreement in the literature on what would constitute a universally accepted set of fundamentals.  
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 Figure 3 plots the (smoothed) probabilities of being in crisis across the two 
measures. Following the turbulence of the second half of 1997 the FX pressures, as 
captured by fxmpi, subsided. Exchange rate depreciation continued for several years after 
1997 without being accompanied by higher interest rates or a loss of reserves. 
 Table 4 shows the estimated correlations for the five countries across the two 
regimes. It can be seen that, for both measures, the magnitude of the correlations change 
from one regime to the other. In some instances, the sign of fxmpi correlations changes as 
well. For example, Thailand’s correlations with the rest of the countries in the sample 
change sign across the two regimes. However, an investor with no sophisticated 
information about the prevailing state of the world at each observation would potentially 
base his/her fund allocation strategy on non-regime dependent (constant) correlations like 
those reported in Tables 1c and 1d. Even though the differences between the constant 
correlations and the crisis ones are less pronounced, it is still possible for the constant 
correlations to convey misleading information. For example, Thailand’s fxmpi correlation 
with Korea is -2.6% increasing to 3.5% during crises. The implication is that an investor 
with assets in Thailand and Korea, who may have allocated funds based on the small 
negative correlation between the two countries, will find that the benefits from such 
diversification are slightly reduced during times of crisis, as the devaluation probability 
and associated default risks increase simultaneously in both countries in times of FX 
turbulence. However, some of the correlations move in the opposite direction, i.e. from a 
positive correlation to a negative one during a crisis period. Even so, in most cases the 
differences in magnitude are not dramatic, a fact that limits the usefulness of the extra 
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information contained in regime-dependent correlations. The same conclusion can be 
reached from an analysis of exchange rate correlations.     
 
Contagion 
          We now turn to the issue of contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have shown that 
an increase in correlations in a crisis state does not necessarily represent contagion. Even 
without a change in the real transmission mechanism the increased volatility in one 
market will result in higher correlation with another market in a crisis state. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) construct a correlation coefficient that controls for the effects of 
heteroscedasticity. Dungey et al. (2005) have extended the test in a multivariate setting. 
For country 1, e.g., we have  
( ) tt
nc
t
,111
1,
,1 '' νδχφσ
ω +⊗Λ+Λ= , 
where t,1ω  contains the stacked values of fxmpi or dlxr for country 1 (the observations 
that correspond to the tranquil periods stacked on top of the observations that correspond 
to the crisis periods), ncσ  denotes the (non time-varying) standard deviation of the non-
crisis observations, φ  and  χ  are vectors of estimated coefficients, Λ is a matrix 
containing scaled, stacked observations of fxmpi or dlxr for the rest of the countries, i.e. 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
−
1,
,1
2,
,2 ...
nnc
tn
nc
t
σ
ω
σ
ω
, and  tδ  is a stacked dummy variable taking the value 0 if the system is 
in a tranquil state and 1 if it is in a crisis state. Similar equations are constructed for the 
rest of the countries. 
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 The classification of observations as crisis or non-crisis is based on the estimation 
of a MSIH(2)-VAR(1) model. The system of equations is estimated with the seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) method. The estimates contained in χ  capture contagion 
effects (if any) so that we can examine the direction and magnitude of spillovers arising 
from a particular country during a crisis. Table 5 presents results for fxmpi and dlxr. 
Focusing on the FX market pressure indicator it turns out that Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines seem to ‘export’ their FX pressures to Indonesia and Thailand, both of which 
appear to be victims of contagion during the sample period. Thailand on the other hand, 
which was the first country to devalue in 1997, only seems to affect Korea. Focusing on 
exchange rate changes, there is no clear direction of contagion effects. Indonesia affects 
and is affected by Thailand. It also affects the Philippines, which in turn affects Thailand 
and Korea. Korea affects Malaysia.  
 These results seem to affirm that no one country in particular is responsible for 
infecting the others. Over the period of the sample (1990-2004) several of the featured 
countries seem to have exported their shocks regionally at some stage affecting 
neighbouring countries to a varying extent. Identifying these shocks requires an extensive 
case-by-case study and is the next step of this research. In addition, the results between 
fxmpi and dlxr are strikingly different, a fact that highlights the different types of 
information that the two measures convey: fxmpi is a wider measure and can indicate a 
crisis even in the absence of an actual devaluation, whereas dlxr only indicates a crisis 
when there is a substantial loss in the value of the currency (in terms of $US) but can 
miss speculative pressures where the use of reserves and the interest rate has been 
successful.  
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Concluding Remarks  
 In this paper, we have used recent advances in econometric techniques to answer 
questions about the interrelationships between south-east Asian foreign exchange markets 
during the period 1990-2004 with a view to gaining a better understanding of a number of 
issues to which the recent literature directs us. South-east Asia is particularly interesting 
given the opportunity to examine countries that are frequently and somewhat loosely 
classified together, as well as the transition sequence from periods that may be 
characterised as non-crisis to crisis and back to non-crisis. 
       As we anticipate from our consideration of the relevant theory, we find that the 
pattern of spillovers varies across countries in the region in terms of their effects on 
exchange rates, interest rates and reserve levels. This implies that monetary authorities 
respond in different ways to FX market pressures. Some are less prepared to see currency 
depreciation than others, even in the context of crises. However, in this paper we do not 
explore in detail what accounts for these differences although we do briefly discuss 
possible explanations. 
We also find that there are significant differences in the strength of spillovers 
suggesting that contagion is not simply a matter of regionalisation. This finding could, 
however, be consistent with a number of potential explanations involving different 
degrees of interdependence, capital market imperfections, and vulnerability to crisis. 
Further research would be needed to tease out the relative importance of these factors in 
explaining the different spillover patterns observed in the region. In this paper we do 
discover that the pattern of correlation between countries sometimes varies across crisis 
and non-crisis periods, even though not dramatically. Importantly, some types of 
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diversification that may be risk-reducing during a non-crisis period may not be risk-
reducing during a crisis. This finding also suggests that reserve pooling arrangements that 
depend on negative correlations amongst participants may be ill-informed if non-crisis 
periods are used to identify correlations that are, in practice, contingent on whether crises 
exist.  
In short the findings reported here counsel against simplistic analyses of 
contagion. Even at the regional level the nature of spillovers is quite complex and the 
responses to them are diverse. We are therefore able to reject stories that emphasise 
uniformity. However, at this stage we are only offering potential explanations of the 
diversity we observe. The next stage in research is to seek a richer and evidence-based 
explanation of these differences. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive statistics fxmpi. 
 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
 Mean  0.926  0.872  0.79  1.271  0.601 
 Median  0.841  0.727  0.595  0.305  0.697 
 Maximum  38.069  8.141  27.597  41.194  13.328 
 Minimum -12.581 -6.346 -18.019 -16.39 -8.076 
 Std. Dev.  5.081  2.258  3.96  6.798  2.357 
 Skewness  2.281  0.218  1.272  1.946  0.351 
 Kurtosis  19.518  4.291  16.483  13.242  9.428 
 Jarque-Bera  2190  13  1404  895  311 
 Observations  179  179  179  179  179 
 
Table 1b: Descriptive statistics dlxr 
 
 dlxr_IND dlxr_KOR dlxr_MAL dlxr_PHI dlxr_THA 
 Mean  0.913  0.240  0.19  0.512  0.234 
 Median  0.358  0.088  0.0  0.144 -0.025 
 Maximum  67.722  36.95  15.679  13.775  17.237 
 Minimum -26.884 -8.856 -14.1 -7.126 -15.377 
 Std. Dev.  7.861  3.579  2.4  2.331  3.063 
 Skewness  3.824  6.241  1.15  1.497  1.609 
 Kurtosis  34.622  64.704  23.33  10.774  18.345 
 Jarque-Bera  7894  29559  3122  517  1833 
 Observations  179  179  179  179  179 
 
Table 1c: Correlations fxmpi 
 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
MPI_IND  1     
MPI_KOR  0.117  1    
MPI_MAL -0.012  0.057  1   
MPI_PHI -0.042 -0.023  0.135  1  
MPI_THA  0.193 -0.026 -0.069  0.020  1 
 
Table 1d: Correlations dlxr 
 
 dlxr_IND dlxr_KOR dlxr_MAL dlxr_PHI dlxr_THA 
dlxr_IND  1     
dlxr_KOR  0.479  1    
dlxr_MAL  0.618  0.441  1   
dlxr_PHI  0.545  0.432  0.584  1  
dlxr_THA  0.623  0.607  0.718  0.655  1 
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Table 2a: MSIH(2)-AR(3) results for fxmpi 
 IND KOR MAL PHI THA 
Mean      
(regime 1) 
0.6548    
(0.1639) 
0.4949    
(0.1376) 
0.4310    
(0.1771) 
0.4674    
(0.3090) 
0.7504    
(0.1484) 
Mean  
(regime 2) 
2.5872    
(1.354) 
0.6120    
(0.2689) 
0.8311    
(1.0186)   
2.6101    
(1.3535) 
-0.0423    
(0.8815) 
SE       
(regime 1) 1.9511 0.84107 1.6194 2.9063 1.3478 
SE      
(regime 2) 10.109 2.6033 6.8225 10.227 4.6150 
Observations  
(regime 1) 137.5 65.4 124.6 113.0 145.6 
Observations  
(regime 2) 38.5 110.6 51.4 63.0 30.4 
11p  0.9463 1 0.9405 0.9811 0.9655 
12p  0.0537 0 0.0595 0.0189 0.0345 
21p  0.1935 0.0089 0.1463 0.0482 0.1697 
22p  0.8065 0.9910 0.8537 0.9518 0.8303 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching specification with two regimes and 
three autoregressive terms. The dependent variable is a foreign exchange market pressure indicator, which 
has been constructed for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
 
Table 2b: MSIH(2)-AR(3) results for dlxr 
 IND KOR MAL PHI THA 
Mean  
(regime 1) 
0.2738    
(0.0342) 
0.0495    
(0.1014) 
0.1280    
(4.0660) 
-0.0035    
(0.0688) 
-0.1152    
(0.0669) 
Mean  
(regime 2) 
1.3227    
(1.2033) 
1.6585    
(2.1383) 
0.1280    
(4.0660) 
0.6837    
(0.3334) 
1.5112    
(1.2203) 
SE       
(regime 1) 0.17942 1.1660 2.3295 0.50134 0.73633 
SE      
(regime 2) 11.197 8.7569 2.3295 2.9652 6.5375 
Observations  
(regime 1) 89.3 157.7 88 88.3 145.2 
Observations  
(regime 2) 86.7 18.3 88 87.7 30.8 
11p  0.9292 0.9657 0.7472 0.8733 0.9333 
12p    0.0708  0.0343 0.2528 0.1267 0.0667 
21p  0.0636 0.2920 0.2528 0.1310 0.3172 
22p    0.9364 0.7080 0.7472 0.8690 0.6828 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching specification with two regimes and 
three autoregressive terms. The dependent variable is the percent change in the nominal exchange rate for 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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Table 3a: MSIH(2)-VAR(1) results for fxmpi 
 IND KOR MAL PHI THA 
Mean R1 0.597619 0.503195 0.489161 0.712728 0.573284 
Mean R2 1.960138 0.641517 1.771888 0.939300 0.696158 
Stan. Err. R1 3.101309 1.702228 2.308724 3.607553 1.563642 
Stan. Err. R2 8.424579 3.172912 6.822248 10.728820 3.633208 
Obs. In R1 129.2 
Obs. In R2 43.8 
11p  0.9635 
12p  0.0365 
21p  0.1128   
22p  0.8872 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching vector autoregression of 
order 1 with two regimes. The dependent variable is a foreign exchange market pressure 
indicator, which has been constructed for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
    
Table 3b: MSIH(2)-VAR(1) results for dlxr 
 IND KOR MAL PHI THA 
Mean R1 0.320101 -0.007432 -0.087561 0.140583 -0.021424 
Mean R2 1.755504 0.749433 1.143743 0.892240 0.867608 
Stan. Err. R1 1.836415 1.314356 0.629406 1.559233 0.934443 
Stan. Err. R2 17.274242 7.378275 5.211998 3.966274 6.599764 
Obs. In R1 141.2 
Obs. In R2 31.8 
11p  0.9411 
12p  0.0589 
21p  0.2683 
22p  0.7317 
Notes: Results are presented for a heteroscedastic Markov switching vector autoregression of 
order 1 with two regimes. The dependent variable is the percent change of the nominal exchange 
rate for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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Table 4a: Correlations in tranquil and crisis regimes fxmpi 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
fxmpi_IND 1  0.1854   -0.0974 -0.1058 0.2809 
fxmpi_KOR 0.0416 1 0.1999 -0.1314 0.0350 
fxmpi_MAL 0.0767 -0.0771 1   0.1797 -0.1883 
fxmpi_PHI 0.0837 0.0895 0.1890 1 -0.0020 
fxmpi_THA -0.0116 -0.0267 0.0383 0.0855 1 
Notes: Contemporaneous correlations in regime 1 (tranquil) are reported below the diagonal and 
contemporaneous correlations in regime 2 (crisis) are reported above the main diagonal. 
 
 
 
Table 4b: Correlations in tranquil and crisis regimes dlxr 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
fxmpi_IND 1    0.3796   0.6450 0.7283 0.5870 
fxmpi_KOR 0.2524 1   0.3602 0.4701 0.5557 
fxmpi_MAL -0.0005 0.0221 1 0.7886 0.7034 
fxmpi_PHI 0.1907   0.2685 0.0217 1 0.8423 
fxmpi_THA 0.5004 0.5796 0.0780 0.2670 1 
Notes: Contemporaneous correlations in regime 1 (tranquil) are reported below the diagonal and 
contemporaneous correlations in regime 2 (crisis) are reported above the main diagonal. 
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Table 5a: Multivariate contagion test fxmpi 
 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
Constant 0.10 (0.09) 0.44* (0.10) 0.12 (0.13) 0.15 (0.12) 0.34* (0.11) 
Delta coef. 0.35 (0.24) 0.45** (0.21) 0.28 (0.33) 0.62** (0.30) -0.78* (0.30) 
INDφ   0.04 (0.10) 0.06 (0.12) 0.02 (0.11) 0.23* (0.10) 
KORφ  0.06 (0.06)  0.15 (0.09) -0.16** (0.08) -0.05 (0.08) 
MALφ  0.01 (0.06) 0.11*** (0.06)  0.25* (0.07) -0.04 (0.07) 
PHIφ  -0.02 (0.06) -0.14*** (0.07) 0.29* (0.08)  0.11 (0.07) 
THAφ  0.30* (0.06) -0.03 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08) 0.10 (0.08)  
INDχ   0.09 (0.13) -0.36 (0.23) -0.13 (0.17) 1.13* (0.19) 
KORχ  0.21* (0.02)  0. 06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) -0.29* (0.04) 
MALχ  0.13* (0.04) 0.03 (0.05)  0.05 (0.04) -0.19* (0.05) 
IPHIχ  -0.18* (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04)  0.17* (0.04) 
THAχ  -0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)* -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)  
Notes: Method of estimation: seemingly unrelated regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level and *** indicate 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 5b: Multivariate contagion test dlxr 
 
 fxmpi_IND fxmpi_KOR fxmpi_MAL fxmpi_PHI fxmpi_THA 
Constant 0.13 (0.23) 0.05 (0.17) -0.15 (0.17) 0.27 (0.20) -0.12 (0.12) 
Delta coef. -0.93 (0.58) 0.34 (0.42) 0.43 (0.44) 0.88*** (0.46) -0.62** (0.30) 
INDφ   -0.12 (0.20) -0.14 (0.21) 0.60** (0.23) 0.28** (0.13) 
KORφ  0.07 (0.28)  -0.28 (0.21) 0.14 (0.24) 0.56*** (0.12) 
MALφ  0.20 (0.22) -0.10 (0.16)  0.25 (0.19) 0.23** (0.11) 
PHIφ  0.25** (0.10) 0.04 (0.07) 0.14*** (0.07)  0.15*** (0.05) 
THAφ  0.39 (0.29) 0.84* (0.19) 0.37 (0.24) 0.39 (0.27)  
INDχ   0.34 (0.21) 0.42 (0.21) -0.42*** (0.24) -0.33** (0.14) 
KORχ  0.34 (0.30)  0.11*** (0.23) -0.20 (0.26) -0.16  (0.13) 
MALχ  0.30 (0.24) -0.08 (0.18)  -0.10 (0.21) 0.09 (0.13) 
IPHIχ  0.27 (0.20) -0.28*** (0.15) 0.12 (0.15)  0.32*** (0.09) 
THAχ  -0.57*** (0.32) -0.07 (0.22) 0.30 (0.26) 0.14 (0.29)  
Notes: Method of estimation: seemingly unrelated regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicate significance at the 5% level and *** indicate 
significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1a: Nominal exchange rates in East Asia 
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Figure 1b: Nominal interest rates in East Asia 
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Figure 1c: International reserves in ($US) in East Asia 
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Figure 2a: Time series plots fxmpi 
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Figure 2b: Time series plot dlxr 
 29
1995 2000 2005
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0 Probabilities of Regime 2
smoothed 
 
1995 2000 2005
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0 Probabilities of Regime 2
smoothed 
 
 
Figure 3: Regime 2 (crisis) probabilities for fxmpi (top) and dlxr (bottom) 
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